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DISCRIMINATION

Can aWorker's Arbitration Agreement
Prevent the EEOC From Seeking
Victim-Specific Relief?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 8-11. © 2001 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is the author of
West's Handbook of Alternative
Dispute Resolution (2d edition), a
member of the National Academy
of Arbitrators, and a professor of
law at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wise.;
jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377.

ISSUE
Does an employee's agreement to
arbitrate employment-related disputes with his or her employer prevent the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
from bringing an enforcement
action against the employer to
obtain victim-specific remedies
(such as backpay, reinstatement,
and damages)?
FACTS
In June 1994, Eric Baker went to a
Waffle House in Columbia, S.C.,
where he filled out and signed an
application for employment with
Waffle House, Inc. The application
included a provision requiring the
applicant to submit to binding arbitration "any dispute or claim concerning Applicant's employment
with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle
House, Inc., or the terms, conditions or benefits of such employment." Baker stated he did not want
a job at the Columbia facility and,
instead, called the manager of the
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Waffle House in West Columbia. The
West Columbia Waffle House manager interviewed Baker and hired him
to begin work as a grill operator in
August 1994. Baker did not fill out
another application for the West
Columbia facility.
Approximately two weeks later,
Baker suffered a seizure at home,
ostensibly caused by a change in
the medication he was taking to
control a seizure disorder that had
developed as a result of a 1992 automobile accident. Immediately after
he arrived for work the next day,
Baker suffered another seizure.
Waffle House discharged Baker on
Sept. 5, 1994, stating in the separation notice that "We decided that
for [Baker's] benefit and safety and
Waffle House it would be best he not
work any more."
Baker filed a charge with the EEOC,
complaining that his discharge violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12111
et seq.). On Sept. 9, 1996, the
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EEOC filed an enforcement action
in its own name against Waffle
House in federal district court, alleging that Waffle House had engaged
in "unlawful employment practices
at its West Columbia, South
Carolina, facility."
The EEOC stated in its complaint
that its reason for filing the suit was
"to correct unlawful employment
practices on the basis of disability
and to provide appropriate relief to
Eric Scott Baker, who was adversely
affected by such practices." As
relief, the EEOC sought (1) a permanent injunction barring Waffle
House from engaging in employment
practices that discriminate on the
basis of disability; (2) an order that
Waffle House institute and carry out
antidiscrimination policies, practices, and programs to create opportunities and to eradicate the effects
of past and present discrimination
on the basis of disability; (3) back
pay and reinstatement for Baker;
(4) compensation for pecuniary and
nonpecuniary losses suffered by
Baker; and (5) punitive damages.
In response to the complaint, Waffle
House filed a petition under the
Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1
et seq.) to compel arbitration and to
stay the litigation and, alternatively,
to dismiss the action for failure to
state a claim. The motion was
referred to a magistrate judge who
found that Baker had entered into
an arbitration agreement with
Waffle House and recommended to
the district court that the EEOC
was required to arbitrate the claims
it had filed on behalf of Baker.
Disagreeing with the magistrate
judge's recommendation, the district
court concluded that the arbitration
provision in Baker's employment
application was inapplicable
because the West Columbia Waffle
House had not hired him pursuant
to his earlier application submitted

at the Columbia Waffle House.
Waffle House then filed an appeal
challenging the district court's
denial of its petition to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court in part, holding that the arbitration agreement in Baker's
employment application did govern
his employment relationship with
Waffle House. EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir.
1999). The Fourth Circuit also held
that, because the EEOC was prosecuting a suit in its own name, it
could not be compelled by the arbitration agreement between Baker
and Waffle House to arbitrate its
claims. However, the Fourth Circuit
went on to hold that although the
EEOC could seek broad injunctive
relief in its public enforcement role,
the arbitration agreement did preclude it from asking a court to
award the individual remedies of
back pay, reinstatement, and compensatory and punitive damages.
The Supreme Court granted the
EEOC's request that it review the
Fourth Circuit's decision. 121 S.Ct.
1401 (2001).
CASE ANALYSIS
Congress enacted the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925 to
reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements
(a hostility that had existed at
English common law and been
adopted by the American courts)
and to place arbitration agreements
on the same footing as other contracts. Relying on the FAA, the
Supreme Court has held that a
court's duty to enforce an arbitration
agreement is not diminished when a
party bound by an agreement raises
a claim found on statutory rights.
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The

Court has reasoned that, by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
Since Gilmer, the courts have routinely ordered employees to arbitrate a wide variety of state and federal statutory claims under the provisions of mandatory arbitration
agreements governing employment
disputes. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns
Int'l Security Services, 105 F.3d
1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Compare
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
121 U.S. 1302 (2001) (an arbitration agreement between an employer and individual employee can be
enforced under the Federal
Arbitration Act without contravening policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific
protection against discrimination
prohibited by law) with Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp.,
525 U.S. 70 (1998) (an arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining
agreement that did not contain a
"clear and unmistakable" waiver of
employees' right to litigate statutory
discrimination claims was not
enforceable).
The question in this case, however,
is not whether the individual
employee is bound by the arbitration agreement, but whether the
EEOC is prevented from obtaining
victim-specific relief for an individual who has agreed to submit his or
her employment disputes, including
those arising from alleged statutory
violations, to binding arbitration.
The EEOC argues that its statutory
authority to obtain victim-specific
relief in a public enforcement action
does not conflict with the terms or
(Continued on Page 10)

American Bar Association

policies of the FAA. It says that the
FAA does not support any limitation
on the remedies the antidiscrimination laws make available to the
EEOC, because the act's terms and
policies are fully vindicated by holding the complainant to his or her
agreement to arbitrate.
Waffle House disagrees, arguing that
the plain text of the Federal
Arbitration Act and the clear congressional policy favoring arbitration
compelled the Fourth Circuit's decision. It says that the Fourth Circuit
correctly harmonized the text and
policies of the Federal Arbitration
Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
In the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress
gave the EEOC the power to sue
employers in federal court. At the
same time, Congress made it clear
that individuals retained their own
causes of action.
Asserting that it is seeking to vindicate the public interest when it
seeks victim-specific remedies, the
EEOC argues that there is no basis
for concluding that it merely represents private parties in such cases
or that it should be bound by private agreements. The EEOC reasons
that Congress' broadening of the
public enforcement role in 1972
beyond "pattern or practice" cases
was based on the premise that there
is a strong public interest in remedying individual cases of discrimination. The EEOC claims that preventing it from recovering victimspecific remedies in any case in
which there is a private arbitration
agreement would seriously compromise its ability to enforce the
antidiscrimination statutes.
According to Waffle House, the
EEOC can fulfill its public-interest
role by seeking injunctive relief. It
says that the Fourth Circuit's deci-

sion promotes the important policy
of providing quick and efficient
relief under the Federal Arbitration
Act and Title VII. Waffle House also
contends that the EEOC's arguments are premised on an obsolete
mistrust of arbitration.
The EEOC responds that, because
the EEOC has not agreed to arbitrate its claims, the Federal
Arbitration Act does not limit its
rights in litigation.
SIGNIFICANCE
The EEOC has issued a policy statement opposing arbitration of discrimination claims as a condition of
employment. It has taken the position that employment discrimination cases must be decided publicly
in a court of law so that each court
judgment will serve as a clear example of the costs of discrimination.
However, the EEOC does support
voluntary, postdispute arbitration
agreements.
The federal circuits disagree as to
whether a binding arbitration agreement signed by an individual
employee also binds the EEOC and
so prevents it from suing on the
employee's behalf. The Second and
Fourth circuits have held that the
EEOC is precluded from suing for
back pay and either compensatory
or punitive damages on behalf of an
employee who has signed an arbitration agreement. EEOC v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303
(2d Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 813 (4th
Cir.1999); Brown v. ABF Freight
Systems, Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 323
(4th Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit
determined that Congress' preference in enforcing arbitration agreements outweighs the interest in
allowing the EEOC to sue for damages on behalf of an individual who
has signed an arbitration agreement.

In EEOC v. Frank'sNursery &
Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 455-56
(6th Cir. 1999), however, the Sixth
Circuit found that Congress, in
amending Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, granted the
EEOC a cause of action distinct
from that of the aggrieved individual
employee. Reasoning that the
EEOC's claim is separate from the
individual's claim, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that the EEOC is not bound
by any arbitration agreement signed
by that individual. Not having
signed the arbitration agreement,
the EEOC retains all of its authority
to bring suit against the employer,
including suing for classwide injunctive relief, back pay, and punitive
damages on behalf of an individual.
The Supreme Court now has the
opportunity to resolve this split in
the federal circuits. A decision in
favor of Waffle House would limit
the EEOC's power to protect the
rights of individual employees by
recovering victim-specific remedies
such as back pay, compensatory
damages, and punitive damages, and
could have a substantial negative
impact on the deterrent effect of the
EEOC's litigation program. Cf.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (if employers
faced only the prospect of an
injunctive order, they would have
little incentive to shun practices of
dubious legality).
A ruling in favor of Waffle House
would also encourage arbitration of
statutory employment disputes, possibly resulting in more employers'
requiring their employees to arbitrate statutory employment disputes. In addition, with the
increased use of mandatory arbitration agreements in consumer agreements (including consumer credit
and investment accounts), a ruling
upholding the Fourth Circuit's decision may raise questions about the
extent of the power of state and fed-
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eral consumer protection agencies
to seek victim-specific remedies in
situations where the victim has
agreed to arbitration.
On the other hand, although a ruling in favor of the EEOC would protect its enforcement powers, it also
could be seen as providing a way for
employees to avoid the arbitration
agreements that they have already
signed. That in turn could result in
multiple proceedings to deal with a
single discrimination claim, thus
fostering delays and increased
expenses as well as the possibility of
inconsistent results.
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